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SIGNALING OR RECIPROCATING? A RESPONSE TO
ERIC POSNER'S LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS
Dan M. Kahan*
There is an almost heretical disenchantment with law percolating within the legal academy. Conventional wisdom sees law as
the natural solution to problems of collective action. When attaining some societal good-for example, a clean environment, a stock
of useful technologies, a public education system, or a transportation infrastructure-depends on the willingness of individuals to
behave in a manner that is not in their material interest, the law
supplies incentives-such as tax abatements for nonpolluters,
property rights for inventors, and punishments for tax
cheats-that bring individual interests into alignment with collective ones. The problem, though, is that a regime of regulatory
incentives is costly. Even when such regulations are sensible in
content, the expense of administering them dissipates the social
surplus generated by collective undertakings. And often they
aren't sensible in content. Securing the enactment of regulatory
law presents a collective action problem in its own right, one that
relatively small, intensely interested groups are more likely to
overcome than are members of the public generally. The result is
the embarrassing spectacle of special interest politics. Law is
thus a deeply imperfect, if not a hopelessly flawed, instrument of
social governance.
This analysis supplies a large part of the impetus behind the
emerging literature on law and social norms. This movement
seeks to identify psychological and social dynamics that promote
contributions to collective goods without the prodding-and hence
without the pathologies-of regulatory incentives. Law might
have a constructive role to play in fostering these behavioral

* Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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mechanisms, but otherwise it should simply get out of the way of
their natural evolution.
The particular mechanism that animates Eric Posner's theory
of law and social norms is reputationalsignaling.' Even when it is
not in their immediate material interest to do so, many individuals, he argues, will decide to contribute to collective goods if and
to the extent that doing so earns them a reputation for reliability
that induces others to enter into profitable undertakings with
them in the future. Ranging over topics as diverse as family law,
shaming penalties, and flag desecration, Posner's is by far the
most systematic and wide-ranging theory of the law and social
norms to date.
But is it right? While admirable in its ambition and insightful
in particular details, Posner's signaling model, I will argue, furnishes a poor vehicle for the social norms and law project.
My analysis will focus on three criteria that I believe are appropriately used to judge any theory of law and social norms. The
first is behavioralrealism: for a theory to be reliable, it must rest
on behavioral dynamics that we have good reason-from empirical testing or otherwise-to believe are grounded in fact. The second criteria is political feasibility: even when based on empirically supportable premises, a social norms theory, to be useful,
must generate determinate and politically attainable policy prescriptions. The final criteria is moral acceptability, which refers
to the compatibility of the theory and its prescriptions with our
basic normative commitments, particularly the ones that we hold
as citizens of a liberal democracy. Posner's signaling model fairs
poorly under all three of these standards.
Because you cannot beat somebody with nobody, I will combine
my critique of Posner's theory with a limited defense of an alternative one based on the dynamic of reciprocity. The reciprocity
theory holds that individuals in collective action settings behave
not like rational wealth maximizers but rather like moral and
emotional reciprocators. 2 When they perceive that other individuals are voluntarily contributing to public goods, most individuals
are moved by honor, generosity, and like dispositions to do the

1. ERIc A. POSNER, LAw AND SocIAl NORMS 18-21 (2000).
2. For further discussion regarding the reciprocity theory, see Dan M. Kahan, Trust,
Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 335-39 (2001).
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same. When, in contrast, they perceive that others are shirking or
otherwise taking advantage of them, individuals are moved by resentment and pride to withhold their own contributions and even
to retaliate if possible. The reciprocity theory implies that because individuals behave in this fashion, the most effective means
to promote cooperative behavior in collective action settings is to
promote trust--the shared belief that others can in fact be
counted on to contribute their fair share to public goods, whether
or not doing so is in their material self-interest. Indeed, the reciprocity theory warns that incentives can often backfire by implying
that most individuals are not inclined to contribute to collective
goods voluntarily. The reciprocity theory, I will suggest, offers
greater behavioral realism, greater political feasibility, and
greater moral acceptability than does Posner's signaling model.

I. BEHAVIORAL REALISM
As with nearly any social norms theory, the best way to understand Posner's is in opposition to the conventional theory of collective action. That theory, most famously associated with Mancur Olson,3 assumes that individuals behave like rational wealth
maximizers. Such individuals will rarely find it worth their while
to contribute resources to attaining collective goods-those the
benefits of which are, absent exclusionary devices, open to enjoyment by all-but instead will free-ride on the contributions that
others make to them. As a result, too few individuals will contribute sufficiently, and the well-being of the group (including society at large) will be frustrated. The only way to overcome this
dilemma is to furnish external incentives-either subsidies or
penalties-that bring the interests of individuals into alignment
with those of the groups to which they belong. From criminal law
to environmental law, from tax fraud to business fraud, from
regulation of the professions to regulation of the Internet, this is
the story that animates American policymaking.
The foundation of Posner's challenge to the conventional view
is that theory's failure to assess how repeat interactions affect behavior within collective action settings.4 In a single encounter-a

3. See generally MANcuR OLSON, THE LoGIC OF COLLECTIVE AcTION (1965).
4. POSNER, supranote 1, at 15-18.
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"one-shot

prisoner's dilemma"-rational wealth maximizers
might experience the collectively self-defeating incentives posited
by Olson and other conventional theorists. But things will likely
be different where those individuals anticipate encountering one
another under such circumstances over and over again. In that
case, each individual might perceive that his or her decision to
contribute or free-ride in one meeting could influence the likelihood that the other individual will do the same in their next
meeting. If so, they might both choose to forego the short-term
material advantage of free-riding in the present in the expectation of reaping the long-term material benefits associated with
mutual cooperation across the run of future interactions. This insight was systematically developed by the political scientist
Robert Axelrod. Using computer simulations and other ingenious
proofs, Axelrod established that even rational wealth maximizers
will converge on a stable pattern of cooperative behavior if they
expect an indefinitely long sequence of future interactions with
individuals whose behavior in collective action settings they are
in a position to monitor and keep track of.5
Posner's distinctive refinement of Axelrod's theory is his account of reputationalsignaling. Posner assumes that individuals
will find other individuals desirable as partners in profitable collective undertakings to the extent that they perceive them to
have low rather than high discount rates.6 Individuals who value
future payoffs as much or nearly as much as present ones are
more likely than those who excessively discount the future to
forego the immediate advantages of shirking or cheating. They
are more likely to do this in the interest of reaping the long-term
benefits associated with access to future trading opportunities.
Accordingly, individuals will seek to acquire a reputation for subordinating short-term to long-term payoffs by engaging in behavior that convincingly demonstrates such a disposition in the eyes
of others. According to Posner, a social norm is just a widespread
pattern of behavior that signals a low rather than a high discount
rate in this manner.7 If contributing to collective goods of various
sorts (among other things) becomes such a signal, then a robust
regime of social norms might minimize the necessity of relying on

5.
6.
7.

See ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTiON OF COOPERATION (1984).
See POSNER, supra note 1, at 19-21.
Id. at 22-23.
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law-with all its attendant costs and pathologies-as a device for
solving problems of collective action.'
That's Posner's story. The question I now want to consider is
whether it is a behaviorally realistic or factually reliable one.
Posner does not present social science data to support his reputational signaling model of social norms; he candidly acknowledges,
in fact, that no such data exist. Nevertheless, he invites us to
credit his account, at least provisionally, on the basis of its power
to furnish plausible explanations for a wide range of readily observable phenomena and to generate empirically testable hypotheses.9
I do not object in principle to the form of pragmatic conjecture
that characterizes Posner's argument. Indeed, I embrace it as frequently the most politically useful and morally responsible mode
of analysis for guiding public policy choices, which we are often
constrained to make on the basis of our best current understanding of human behavior, whether or not that understanding has
been subjected to the rigors of social science testing.' ° Nevertheless, I believe Posner's signaling model, as it stands, fails this
pragmatic test and should not be trusted to guide public policy
even provisionally for four distinct reasons.
First, whatever informal or casual explanatory power Posner's
account appears to have is attributable to its overdetermination.
A theory can be said to be overdetermined when it furnishes a
menu of opposing behavioral mechanisms that are sufficiently
abundant to account for essentially any phenomena as well as its
negation. In that circumstance, the theory does not generate "explanations" at all; it merely supplies a convenient set of storytelling templates that allow the theorist to rationalize ex post
whatever existing facts she encounters and to justify whatever
policy prescriptions she chooses ex ante. Rational choice theories
are notoriously vulnerable to this defect."

8. Id.
9. Id. at 36-38.
10. See generally Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in
the Inner City, 32 LAW & SoCdy REV. 805 (1998).
11. See generally JON ELSTER, NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 7-10
(1989); Jon Elster, A Plea for Mechanisms, in SOCIAL MECHANISMS: AN ANALYTICAL
APPROACH TO SOCIAL THEORY 45 (Peter Hedstr6m & Richard Swedberg eds., 1998);
Jeanne L. Schroeder, Just So Stories: Posnerian Methodology, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 351
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Posner's is no exception. The signaling model explains why
costly patterns of behavior, "like gift-giving, consumption of expensive goods, and shunning of people with certain characteristics," become norms: precisely because such behaviors involve
sacrifice of material wealth or opportunities to accumulate it,
they convey that those who engage in them "value future payoffs
more than bad types [i.e., those with high discount rates] do." 2
But some norms, "like combing [one's] hair in one way rather
than another," impose only trivial costs.13 No problem, the signaling model explains conformity to them as well: "people engage
even in cheap actions ...because their deviation from the norm
will be punished by others who seek to signal their types by taking the costly action of shunning people who act in an unusual
14
way."

The signaling model readily explains why individuals slavishly
conform to inconvenient but widespread patterns of behavior. If
they did not, members of the social mainstream would infer that
they lack discipline or willpower-in other words, that they have
high discount rates-and would therefore exclude them from profitable collective undertakings.
Yet the signaling model can also explain why others conspicuously flout mainstream norms. The wealthy and powerful are not
dependent on the collaboration of others and thus frequently feel
no compunction against "violat[ing] common norms against ostentation, waste, and civility"; and "because people sometimes infer
that those who violate norms must be wealthy and powerful,
there is an independent incentive for people to violate norms-as
a way of signaling their wealth and power," attributes that make
them attractive trading partners after all.'5 Members of deviant
subgroups will also ostentatiously defy mainstream normspossibly by engaging in behavior that might connote excessive
present-mindedness (i.e., a high discount rate), such as bodypiercing, law breaking, or drug use-for signaling purposes. 6
Precisely because such behavior predictably alienates them from

(2001).
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

POSNER, supra note 1, at 25.
Id.
Id. at 25-26.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 28-29.
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the mainstream, those who engage in it demonstrate the depths
of their commitment to the deviant subgroup and thus make
themselves appear reliable to other deviants, thereby maximizing
17
"future payoffs from people outside mainstream society."
In short, "anything"--costly sacrifices or trivial gestures, conformity or rebellion-"can be a signal." 8 But if anything can be a
signal, then the signaling model can be used to tell whatever
story the modeler wants.
Notwithstanding its malleability, Posner's attempt to reduce
all norms to signaling behavior generates at least one consistent
result that seems completely at odds with "common intuitions
and data"'g-namely, the correlation of zealotry with materialist
values. This is the second reason to doubt the theory's behavioral
realism.
Social norms notoriously underwrite all manner of intolerance
and persecution. For Posner, this aspect of social norms, too, derives from the power of conformity to signal one's fitness as a potential trading partner to members of the social mainstream. By
denouncing flag burners and other political subversives, ° discriminating against racial minorities,2 ' and persecuting homosexuals,22 individuals conspicuously forego immediate opportunities to profit from interactions with them, and thus signal a low
discount rate that redounds to their long-term material benefit.23
This story, which figures throughout Law and Social Norms, is
just plain weird. Casual observation furnishes little reason to believe that those who submit to virulent frenzies of intolerance end
up with the greatest business opportunities. On the contrary,
someone who shows up, say, for a job interview or for a meeting
with a prospective creditor espousing "white pride," homophobia,
or even fervent patriotism is much more likely to alienate than to
17. Id. at 29.
18. Id. at 25.
19. Id. at 36.
20. Id. at 115-17.
2L Id. at 133-40.
22. Id. at 84-86, 127.
23. Of course, others choose to engage in flag burning to signal that they "reject[] the
values of the majority," a costly gesture that "reduces one's opportunities to deal with
those who respect the flag" and thus "serve[s] to reveal that one has a low discount rate"
and is therefore a suitable trading partner for members of the subversive subcommunity.
Id. at 117. Again, "anything can be a signal." Id. at 25.
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impress a potential trading partner--even one who (more quietly)
shares his particular chauvinism. A more sensible strategy for
marketing oneself in the world of commerce is to show that one
loves money so much that one is willing to do business with all
comers; think of Michael Eisner's sponsorship of "Gay Pride Day"
at Disney World over the howls of protest and dire warnings of
the religious right.24 Indeed, capitalism is famously (if unevenly)
praised for its tendency to supplant group identification with
more individualistic, bourgeois tastes and thus to quiet historic
sources of social factionalization and strife.25 A behavioral theory
that seems to get this feature of our social experience so decidedly
wrong-as Posner's does-hardly seems reliable.
The third reason to doubt the behavioral realism of Posner's
theory has to do with the coherence of his central claim that a
person's conformity to norms signals her "discount rate." According to a vast body of empirical literature, the phenomenon of a
generic "discount rate" just does not exist.26 The concept of a "discount rate" characterizes an individual's preference for immediate
over future wealth. But since 1937, when Paul Samuelson first
27
advanced the idea that individuals have such a preference sustained empirical research by economists and others have failed to
demonstrate behavior consistent with it. Instead of exhibiting any
generic discount rate, individuals' preferences for immediate over
future wealth have been shown to be highly context specific. Indeed, a plausible interpretation of the empirical literature is that
the degree to which individuals are willing to sacrifice present
gains for future ones is governed by social norms that define
when the seeking of immediate gratification is morally acceptable.2" If so, discount rates cannot be said to cause social norms,
as Posner posits; rather, norms cause (diverse, context-specific)

24. See Thomas B. Edsall, ForecastingHavoc for Orlando: On TV, Robertson Says Display of Gays' FlagsInvites Disaster,WASH. POST, June 10, 1998, at All.
25. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL
ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH (1977); STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS
AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1995).
26. See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler & George Loewenstein, Intertemporal Choice, in
RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC
LIFE 92, 92-106 (1992).
27. See generally Paul A. Samuelson, Some Aspects of the Pure Theory of Capital, 51
Q.J. ECON. 469 (1937).
28. See generally Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, Time Discounting: A CriticalReview, J. ECON. LITERATURE (forthcoming 2002).
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discount rates. In any event, the impossibility of specifying any
individual's generic preference for immediate over future wealth
makes it impossible to accept Posner's invitation to test his theory with data that correlates "conformity to social norms" with
the "independent variable" of "discount rate."2 9
Fourth and finally, Posner's model is inconsistent with a
wealth of empirical data on how individuals actually do behave in
collective action settings. Economists and social psychologists
have developed a diverse array of constructs-the "investment
game,""0 the "ultimatum game,"3 the "moonlighting game, 3 2 and
others 3 -- to simulate collective action problems in the laboratory.
They have also extensively tested and measured collective action
dynamics in field experiments and various real world environments.' Such studies consistently show that most individuals in
collective action settings tend to adopt a conditionally cooperative
stance, contributing to collective goods if and to the extent that
they perceive the others are inclined to do the same. This finding contravenes the conventional theory, which predicts that individuals, as rational wealth maximizers, will withhold their contributions no matter what they expect others to do, generating an
equilibrium of universal free-riding.
But this same literature also contravenes the logic of Posner's
reputational signaling model. In the laboratory and other settings, individuals will behave like conditional cooperators even
when they play one-shot or finitely repeated games under conditions of anonymity. Designed to exclude an Axelrodian explanation, these conditions also rule out a Posnerian one for the willingness of individuals to engage in conditional cooperation in

29. POSNER, supranote 1, at 36.
30. See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gichter, Fairnessand Retaliation:The Economics ofReciprocity, 14 J. EcoN. PERSp. 159, 162 (2000).
3L See generally Colin Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, Ultimatums, Dictators and
Manners,9 J. EcON. PERSP.209 (1995).
32. See generally Klaus Abbink, Bernd Irlenbusch & Elke Renner, The Moonlighting
Game:An ExperimentalStudy on Reciprocity and Retribution;42 J. EcON. BEHAV. & ORG.
265 (2000).
33. See Armin Falk & Urs Fischbacher, A Theory of Reciprocity 30 (Feb. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
34. See generally Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms,
14 J. ECON. PERSp. 137 (2000).
35. See generally Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Two Theories of Collective
Action (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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actual collective action settings. For where they do not anticipate
dealing with each other repeatedly and indefinitely, and where
they in fact cannot keep track of each other's past behavior, individuals who behave like simple rational wealth maximizers have
no incentive-indeed, no capacity-to reward cooperation with
cooperation (or defection with defection) for the sake of developing a reputation.
The findings of the empirical literature make sense only if we
assume that individuals in collective action settings behave like
moral and emotional reciprocators rather than mere wealth
maximizers. Moral and emotional reciprocators behave like conditional cooperators not because they believe that doing so will enrich them materially but because they value the experience of behaving cooperatively for its own sake, so long as they are not
being exploited by others when they do so. Consistent with ordinary experience, susceptible of empirical validation, and in fact
amply supported by existing social science data, this reciprocity
dynamic clearly dominates Posner's reputational signaling theory
along the dimension of behavioral realism.
II. POLITICAL FEASIBILITY
To be useful, a social norms theory must not only be behaviorally realistic but also capable of generating determinate and sensible policy prescriptions. How does Posner's reputational signaling model rate on this scale?
A good test is the problem of tax evasion. Tax compliance is the
archetypical collective action problem for public policy. Society
collects taxes to finance a variety of goods-from education to
highways to national defense-that benefit its members collectively but that self-interested individuals lack sufficient incentive
to produce through voluntary transactions. Yet if we assume that
individuals behave like rational wealth maximizers, then we
should expect them to refrain from voluntarily paying their taxes
as well. Accordingly, the conventional theory of collective action
prescribes the use of material incentives-in the form of penalties
for tax evasion-to induce compliance."

36. See generally Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A
TheoreticalAnalysis, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 323 (1972).
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The assumption that individuals decide to comply or evade paying their taxes on the basis of a simple cost-benefit analysis, however, is embarrassingly ill-supported by empirical evidence. Tax
compliance rates-which vary dramatically across nations-seem
to bear no connection to enforcement levels.37 For example, tax
cheats face a much higher expected penalty in many European
nations than they do in the United States, yet the United States
enjoys a higher compliance rate."
Tax scholars attribute such cross-national variance to differences in social norms, or "tax climates," across nations. 9 Whereas
evasion is viewed as a breach of an important civic obligation in
the United States, it is viewed as a fairly trivial regulatory offense-akin to a traffic violation-in many European ones.4"
These differences in norms have been confirmed by laboratory
experiments, which show that Americans are significantly less
likely to evade taxes whether the expected penalty for evasion is
high or low than are, say, Spaniards, who freely underreport their
taxes whenever the expected return for doing so is positive."
Indeed, far from promoting compliance, simply increasing the
penalties for evasion has been shown to undermine it, at least in
societies that otherwise enjoy relatively compliant norms. One
study, for example, found that taxpayers who were exposed to information emphasizing the severity of tax-evasion penalties
claimed more deductions than did similarly situated taxpayers
exposed either to a moral appeal or to no information at all.42 Another study found that individuals who were shown actual press
accounts of an IRS plan to attack the "tax gap" with stepped-up
auditing displayed a weaker commitment to paying their own
taxes.4 3

37. Kahan, supranote 2, at 341.
38. Id.
39. See FRANKA. COWELL, CHEATING THE GOVERNMENT: THE ECONOMICS OF EVASION

102-03 (1990).
40. Kahan, supranote 2, at 341.
41 See James Alm, Isabel Sanchez & Ana de Juan, Economic and Noneconomic Factors in Tax Compliance,48 KYKLOS 3, 13-14 (1995).
42. See Richard D. Schwartz & Sonya Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U. CHI. L. REV.
274, 298-99 (1967).
43. See Steven M. Sheffrin & Robert K. Triest, Can Brute DeterrenceBackfire? Perceptions and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE
AND ENFORCEMENT 193, 212-13 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992).
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Not surprisingly, Posner sees the signature of reputational signaling in the contribution that norms make to tax compliance.
Scrupulously honoring one's tax obligations, Posner argues, is another way to demonstrate that one has a "low discount rate" and
is thus a suitable trading partner.' Indeed, according to Posner,
the value of tax compliance as a signal of this sort is greatest
when the penalty is set well below the expected gain from evasion, for that's when it is most obvious that a compliant taxpayer
is foregoing the temptation to cheat for immediate profit. As a result, a nation, such as the United States, can achieve high rates
of compliance, motivated by signaling, notwithstanding low penalties. Nations that foolishly raise their penalties eviscerate the
signaling value of compliance and can thus end up with more evasion on net.4 5
Although Posner's story "fits" the tax compliance data, (remember: "anything can be a signal"46 ), it furnishes a singularly
unconvincing explanation for it. In order for any species of behavior to signal something about a person's discount rate, that behavior must be readily observable. In the United States, at least,
whether a person is complying with her tax obligations can't be
observed by members of the public generally. There is no public
registry of individual tax returns, which are in fact protected
from disclosure by privacy legislation.
Indeed, a taxpayer deemed to have underpaid her tax by an
IRS auditor can avoid any public record of her deficiency simply
by settling with the government before the commencement of
formal administrative or legal proceedings.48 Thus, far from facilitating the positive signal of a clean tax record, United States law
deliberately ambiguates it.
Of course, individuals are perfectly free to make their tax returns available for inspection, either by members of the public
generally or by potential trading partners in particular. That's

44. See Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1781, 1789-90 (2000).
45. See id. at 1790-91.
46. POSNER, supra note 1, at 25.
47. See 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a) (1994).
48. Section 6103 of the Tax Code has been construed to cover information generated
in IRS investigations, including audits. See, e.g., Mallas v. United States, 993 F.2d 1111,
1122-24 (4th Cir. 1993).
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presumably exactly what they would do if compliance were regarded as a valuable signal of their fitness for trade. But there is
in fact no such norm of spontaneous tax disclosure in our society.
Indeed, anyone who showed up at a commercial negotiation eager
to display his or her latest tax returns would probably be regarded not as a trustworthy business partner but as some kind of
freak.
Again, reciprocity furnishes a more plausible account of the
contribution that norms make to tax compliance. Experimental
studies show that whether an individual is likely to evade her tax
obligations is strongly predicted by whether those around her express an intention to comply or not.49 Likewise, the higher an individual believes the rate of tax-cheating to be in general, the
more likely he or she is to cheat too.50 These findings are exactly
what one would expect were tax compliance and evasion motivated by reciprocal dispositions. Moral and emotional reciprocators take pride in contributing their fair share to public goods, but
deeply resent being taken advantage of. With tax collection, as
with other collective action settings, the extent to which others
appear to be contributing to the good in question determines
which of these sensibilities-pride or resentment-comes into
play. If most other individuals seem to be paying their taxes, then
the decision to pay hers gratifies a reciprocator's desire to be a
good citizen. In contrast, if most individuals appear to be evading
paying taxes, then complying will make her feel like a sucker.
The phenomenon of national "tax climates" also fits the reciprocity theory. Because individuals are reciprocators, their decisions in a collective-action setting feed on and reinforce each
other, generating multiple high- and low-cooperation equilibria
independent of the payoffs associated with cooperating or defecting. Accordingly, we should not expect, under the reciprocity theory, to see any fixed correspondence across nations between the
49. See, e.g., Marco R. Steenbergen, Kathleen M. McGraw, & John T. Scholz, Taxpayer
Adaptationto the 1986 Tax Reform Act: Do New Tax Laws Affect the Way Taxpayers Think
About Taxes?, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 9 (Joel
Slemrod ed., 1992).
50. See Robert B. Cialdini, Social Motivations to Comply: Norms, Values, and Principles, in 2 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE 200, 215 (Jeffrey A. Roth & John T. Scholz eds., 1989);
James P. F. Gordon, Individual Morality and Reputations Costs as Deterrents to Tax Evasion, 33 EUR. ECON. REV. 797, 804 (1989); Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The Criminal
Deterrence Literature:Implications for Research on Taxpayer Compliance, in 2 TAXPAYER
COMPLIANCE, supra, at 126, 144; Sheffrin & Triest, supra note 43, at 214.
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expected penalty for evasion and compliance levels. If individuals
believe that those around them are inclined to pay their taxes,
they will (as a result of guilt, shame, pride and the like) be more
likely to comply, thereby strengthening the perception that individuals are generally inclined to pay. If, in contrast, individuals
believe that those around them are inclined to evade, resentment
will inhibit them from complying, thus strengthening the perception that most individuals are inclined to cheat. In other words,
what we should expect to see under the reciprocity theory is exactly what we do see-viz., competing and relatively durable
norms toward tax compliance. 5 '
The reciprocity theory not only furnishes a convincing explanation for the phenomenon of tax evasion; it also suggests a novel
theory for combating it: the promotion of trust. If the government
can make individuals believe that others are inclined to comply
with their obligations, then individual taxpayers-as reciprocators--should be more inclined to pay themselves. This insight was
borne out by a study sponsored by the Minnesota Department of
Revenue." In that study, researchers sent letters to a group of
individuals stating that tax compliance rates were in fact much
higher than what public opinion polls suggested citizens believed
them to be.53 Those individuals thereafter reported more income
and claimed fewer deductions than did individuals in a control
group.54 Consistent with the reciprocity theory of collective action-and at odds with the conventional rational choice one-the
Minnesota study also found that simply advising taxpayers that
others were inclined to comply was more cost-effective than the
threat of an audit!55
Indeed, the reciprocity theory helps to explain why such
threats have sometimes been shown to backfire. When the IRS
engages in dramatic gestures to make individuals aware that it is

51. See Sheffrin & Triest, supra note 43, at 194-95 (suggesting interdependence of
taxpayer decisionmaking should generate multiple behavioral equilibria); see also
COWELL, supra note 39, at 112-13 (developing theoretical model predicting multiple compliance equilibria based on interdependence of taxpayers' decisions to evade).
52. See STEPHEN COLEMAN, MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, THE MINNESOTA
INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE EXPERIMENT: STATE TAX RESULTS 5-6 (Apr. 1996), available at
http://www.taxes.state.mn.us/reports/complnce.pdf.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 18-19.
55. See id. at 24-25.
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redoubling its efforts to catch and punish tax evaders, it also
causes individuals to infer that more taxpayers than they thought
are choosing to cheat. 6 This inference in turn triggers a reciprocal motive to evade, which dominates the greater material incentive to comply associated with the higher than expected penalty.
Because it misunderstands the contribution that social norms
make to tax evasion, the conventional strategy suggests a selfdefeating strategy for dealing with it.
But because it misunderstands the reciprocal nature of these
norms, Posner's theory suggests a prescription that is similarly
ill-conceived. As I have argued, the unobservability of tax compliance makes reputational signaling an unconvincing explanation
for widespread compliance in the United States. But if one believed that individuals could be motivated to comply to send a
signal of their low discount rates, and hence of their desirability
as trading partners, then the right policy would presumably be to
make noncompliance as transparent as possible. It would, in that
case, make sense to repeal the provisions that now permit taxpayers to shield adverse audit findings from public view. Indeed,
to promote signaling, it would probably be a good idea to institute
procedures for publicizing the identities of delinquents as widely
and dramatically as possible, possibly through shaming penalties.57
The logic of reciprocity, however, suggests that such reforms
would likely be a disaster. Campaigns to broadcast the names of
tax evasion cheats, like high-profile enforcement crack downs,
could well induce individuals to revise upward their estimation of
the extent of tax evasion. If so, such publicity would predictably
generate resentment and a negative reciprocal motivation to
evade in kind. The result would be not more tax compliance but
less.
The reputational signaling model generates a politically naive
prescription about tax evasion. And there is little reason to think
that it would do any better elsewhere.

56. See id. at 25.
57. See generally Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals:
A Proposalfor Reform of the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365 (1999).
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III. MORAL DESIRABILITY

The last criterion appropriate for judging social norm theories
such as Posner's is moral desirability. Even assuming they are
behaviorally realistic and generate worthwhile prescriptions, are
the programs they underwrite consistent with our basic moral
commitments?
To see what's at stake here, it helps to reformulate the impetus
for the social norms project in slightly broader terms. What connects all of the social norm approaches is their responsiveness to
what might be called the paradox of liberalism. The genius of liberal institutions is their power to detach us from divisive group
identities and commitments. When we are conditioned to think of
ourselves as wealth seekers, we stop thinking of ourselves as
members of particular classes, as descendants of particular races
or ethnicities, and as adherents to particular religious faiths. Accordingly, we stop thinking of those of other classes, races, ethnicities, and faiths as the bearers of status claims that compete
with our own, and start to think of them instead as the bearers of
preferences and interests that create opportunities for profitable
trades and wealth-maximizing political arrangements. 8
But if we do indeed think of ourselves as mere wealth seekers,
it is unclear that we will succeed in exploiting these opportunities. As the conventional theory of collective action tells us, individuals who relentlessly pursue their material self-interest will
behave in ways that systematically frustrate their collective wellbeing, both in markets and in politics. Using law to compel individuals to behave cooperatively in these settings is not a fully satisfactory solution, for the costly maintenance of such a regime
dissipates the wealth associated with free trade, not to mention
the liberty secured by liberal political institutions. Precisely because it disconnects us from our commitment-laden group identities, liberalism seems to leave us without the minimal moral capacity to commit to the economic and political institutions that a
liberal society presupposes.
The social norm project attempts to remedy this defect in liberalism. Its aim is to identify psychological and social mechanisms

58.

See HIRSHMAN, supra note 25, at 4.
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that dispose individuals to behave consistently with their collective interests without legal prodding.
The problem, though, for most of the social norm programs is
that they seem to assume the vitality of the group commitments
that liberalism displaces. This is most obviously true for "communitarian" theories like Michael Sandel's"9 and even Robert
Putnam's, ° which advocate cultivation of the partisan attachments of ethnicity, faith, and locale. It is also true for proposals
like Richard McAdams's, 6 ' as well as my own, 2 to harness
"shame" and "stigma," which regulate individuals by threatening
to reassign them from a respected high-status class to a despised
low-status one.
But it is even true, ironically, for seemingly hard-edged rational choice theories like Robert Ellickson's, Lisa Bernstein's,
63
and Eric Posner's that emphasize mechanisms like "tit-for-tat,"
"reputation,"" and "signaling."65 Descended from Axelrod's brilliant revision of the conventional theory, all of these approaches
depend on very specialized conditions: rational wealth maximizers will have an incentive to reciprocate cooperation with cooperation and free-riding with costly forms of punishment only if
they anticipate dealing indefinitely with particular individuals
whose behavior they can observe and keep track of. Those fairly
intimate conditions are not present in the tax-compliance setting,
for example; nor are they present in most of the other n-person
prisoner's dilemmas that are the subject of public policymaking in

59. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 231-32 (1996).
60. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMfUNITy (2000).

6L

See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96

MICH. L. REV. 338, 365-66 (1997).

62. See generally Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CI. L.
REV. 591 (1996).
63. See ROBERT C. ELLcKsON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HoW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 9 (1991).

64. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1789 (1996); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal ContractualRelations in the Diamond
Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 138 (1992); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in
the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99
MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1745 (2001).

65. See POSNER, supranote 1, at 18-19.
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nations as vast and impersonal as the United States.6 6 Their dependence on seemingly moribund sources of group commitment
makes the prescriptions generated by these theories less behaviorally realistic and less politically feasible than those generated
by the reciprocity theory, which-as the tax example illustratesexplains how and when individuals can be expected to cooperate
even with strangers.
Just as important, however, their association with traditional
sources of commitment makes these theories morally problematic.
The cures that these theories propose for treating liberalism's
major affliction risk vitiating liberalism's major accomplishment-the quieting of contentious social rivalries. The anxiety
that the self-conscious regulation of social norms will infuse our
political life with divisive "insider"-"outsider" distinctions furnishes the major source of opposition to the social norm project,
both within and outside the academy. It deserves to be taken seriously by all social norm theorists. Yet Posner has little to say on
this score.
Again, the reciprocity theory furnishes a better alternative. In
contrast to the reputational signaling model as well as the other
diverse social norm programs, the reciprocity theory doesn't rest
on any particular set of social preconditions. To be sure, individuals will reciprocate with those whom they know and identify with;
but they will also repay cooperation with cooperation in highly
impersonal settings, such as labor markets and tax collection systems. 67 Interactions among individuals who deal repeatedly with
one another will ground reciprocity dynamics; but so will the
fleeting encounters among strangers, as laboratory experiments
confirm.
The social malleability of reciprocity ultimately makes it more
congenial to liberalism than are other social norm alternatives to
the conventional theory of collective action. Because they don't
depend on deep-seated group affinities, commitments founded on
reciprocity can be built into the roles we inhabit as members of a
liberal society. A white homophobic man in Mountain State cannot easily be made to display moral commitment to an Asian les-

66. See generally Francis Fukuyama, Differing Disciplinary Perspectives on the Origins of Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 479, 489-90 (2001).
67. See Kahan, supra note 35, at 11.
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bian in Bay State when he appraises her as such. But if he can be
made to think of her as a fellow taxpayer, market participant,or
even waste producerhe can be induced to reciprocate her cooperative behavior with cooperative behavior of his own.
Liberalism quiets social conflict by conditioning us to think of
ourselves as unencumbered by divisive group commitments. The
reciprocity model conserves this feature of liberalism, while correcting its tendency to make us think of ourselves as unencumbered by any moral commitments at all.
CONCLUSION

Eric Posner's Law and Social Norms is an impressive but ultimately flawed attempt to systematize the unruly elements of
thought that pervade the growing literature on norms and law.
His attempt to reduce norms to reputational signaling is behaviorally unrealistic. The prescriptions that his account generates
are politically naive. And the program that his model would
commit us to as a means of correcting the deficiencies of liberal
institutions is insufficiently respectful of the achievement of those
institutions in quieting historic forms of social antagonism. Contending with Posner's theory will force social norm theorists to
advance well beyond their current frameworks; however, in order
for the social norms project to succeed, those theorists will have to
advance far beyond Posner's as well.

